# Difference between revisions of "Finite set"

en>DexDor (→References: rm Terminology cat (the title may be a term, but the article is not about language)) |
en>JRSpriggs (Undid revision 566676304 by 2002:65DE:7B18:0:0:0:65DE:7B18 (talk) wrong) |
||

Line 13: | Line 13: | ||

==Basic properties== | ==Basic properties== | ||

Any proper [[subset]] of a finite set ''S'' is finite and has fewer elements than ''S'' itself. As a consequence, there cannot exist a [[bijection]] between a finite set ''S'' and a proper subset of ''S''. Any set with this property is called [[Dedekind-finite]]. Using the standard [[Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory|ZFC]] axioms for [[set theory]], every Dedekind-finite set is also finite, but this requires the [[axiom of choice]] (or at least the [[axiom of | Any proper [[subset]] of a finite set ''S'' is finite and has fewer elements than ''S'' itself. As a consequence, there cannot exist a [[bijection]] between a finite set ''S'' and a proper subset of ''S''. Any set with this property is called [[Dedekind-finite]]. Using the standard [[Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory|ZFC]] axioms for [[set theory]], every Dedekind-finite set is also finite, but this requires the [[axiom of choice]] (or at least the [[axiom of countable choice]]). | ||

Any [[injective function]] between two finite sets of the same cardinality is also a [[surjective function|surjection]], and similarly any surjection between two finite sets of the same cardinality is also an injection. | Any [[injective function]] between two finite sets of the same cardinality is also a [[surjective function|surjection]], and similarly any surjection between two finite sets of the same cardinality is also an injection. | ||

Line 51: | Line 51: | ||

== Foundational issues == | == Foundational issues == | ||

[[Georg Cantor]] initiated his theory of sets in order to provide a mathematical treatment of infinite sets. Thus the distinction between the finite and the infinite lies at the core of set theory. Certain foundationalists, the [[finitism|strict finitists]], reject the existence of infinite sets and thus advocate a mathematics based solely on finite sets. Mainstream mathematicians consider strict finitism too confining, but acknowledge its relative consistency: the universe of [[hereditarily finite set]]s constitutes a model of [[Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory]] with the [[axiom of infinity]] replaced by its negation. | |||

[[Georg Cantor]] initiated his theory of sets in order to provide a mathematical treatment of infinite sets. Thus the distinction between the finite and the infinite lies at the core of set theory. Certain foundationalists, the [[finitism|strict finitists]], reject the existence of infinite sets and thus advocate a mathematics based solely on finite sets. Mainstream mathematicians consider strict finitism too confining, but acknowledge its relative consistency: the universe of [[hereditarily finite set]]s constitutes a model of [[Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory]] with the [[ | |||

Even for those mathematicians who embrace infinite sets, in certain important contexts, the formal distinction between the finite and the infinite can remain a delicate matter. The difficulty stems from [[Gödel's incompleteness theorems]]. One can interpret the theory of hereditarily finite sets within [[Peano arithmetic]] (and certainly also vice-versa), so the incompleteness of the theory of Peano arithmetic implies that of the theory of hereditarily finite sets. In particular, there exists a plethora of so-called [[non-standard models]] of both theories. A seeming paradox, non-standard models of the theory of hereditarily finite sets contain infinite sets --- but these infinite sets look finite from within the model. (This can happen when the model lacks the sets or functions necessary to witness the infinitude of these sets.) On account of the incompleteness theorems, no first-order predicate, nor even any recursive scheme of first-order predicates, can characterize the standard part of all such models. So, at least from the point of view of first-order logic, one can only hope to characterize finiteness approximately. | Even for those mathematicians who embrace infinite sets, in certain important contexts, the formal distinction between the finite and the infinite can remain a delicate matter. The difficulty stems from [[Gödel's incompleteness theorems]]. One can interpret the theory of hereditarily finite sets within [[Peano arithmetic]] (and certainly also vice-versa), so the incompleteness of the theory of Peano arithmetic implies that of the theory of hereditarily finite sets. In particular, there exists a plethora of so-called [[non-standard models]] of both theories. A seeming paradox, non-standard models of the theory of hereditarily finite sets contain infinite sets --- but these infinite sets look finite from within the model. (This can happen when the model lacks the sets or functions necessary to witness the infinitude of these sets.) On account of the incompleteness theorems, no first-order predicate, nor even any recursive scheme of first-order predicates, can characterize the standard part of all such models. So, at least from the point of view of first-order logic, one can only hope to characterize finiteness approximately. | ||

Line 77: | Line 76: | ||

==See also== | ==See also== | ||

*[[FinSet]] | |||

*[[Ordinal number]] | |||

*[[Peano arithmetic]] | *[[Peano arithmetic]] | ||

==References== | ==References== | ||

* | *{{Citation|last=Suppes|first=Patrick|author-link=Patrick Suppes|year=1972|origyear=1960|title=Axiomatic Set Theory|publisher=Dover Publications Inc.|edition=Paperback|series=Dover Books on Mathematics|isbn=0-486-61630-4}} | ||

*{{ | *{{Citation | last=Herrlich | first=Horst |author-link=Horst Herrlich | title=Axiom of Choice | publisher = [[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer-Verlag]]| location=Berlin | year=2006 | series=Lecture Notes in Math. 1876 | isbn=3-540-30989-6 }} | ||

* Richard Dedekind | *{{Citation|last=Dedekind|first=Richard|author-link=Richard Dedekind|year=2012|title=Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge, UK|edition=Paperback|series=Cambridge Library Collection|isbn=978-1-108-05038-8}} | ||

* Kazimierz Kuratowski | **{{Citation|last=Dedekind|first=Richard|author-link=Richard Dedekind|others=Beman, Wooster Woodruff|year=1963|title=Essays on the Theory of Numbers|publisher=Dover Publications Inc.|edition=Paperback|series=Dover Books on Mathematics|isbn=0-486-21010-3}} | ||

*{{Citation|last=Kuratowski|first=Kazimierz|author-link=Kazimierz Kuratowski|year=1920|title=Sur la notion d'ensemble fini|journal=[[Fundamenta Mathematicae]]|volume=1|publisher=|pages=129–131|url=http://matwbn.icm.edu.pl/ksiazki/fm/fm1/fm1117.pdf|format=PDF}} | |||

*{{Citation|last=Tarski|first=Alfred|author-link=Alfred Tarski|year=1924|title=Sur les ensembles finis|journal=[[Fundamenta Mathematicae]]|volume=6|publisher=|pages=45–95|url=http://matwbn.icm.edu.pl/ksiazki/fm/fm6/fm619.pdf|format=PDF}} | |||

== External links == | |||

*{{MathWorld |title=Finite Set |id=FiniteSet |author=[[Margherita Barile|Barile, Margherita]]}} | |||

{{logic}} | {{logic}} | ||

{{Set theory}} | |||

[[Category:Basic concepts in set theory]] | [[Category:Basic concepts in set theory]] | ||

[[Category:Cardinal numbers]] | [[Category:Cardinal numbers]] | ||

## Revision as of 06:19, 1 August 2013

In mathematics, a **finite set** is a set that has a finite number of elements. For example,

is a finite set with five elements. The number of elements of a finite set is a natural number (non-negative integer), and is called the cardinality of the set. A set that is not finite is called **infinite**. For example, the set of all positive integers is infinite:

Finite sets are particularly important in combinatorics, the mathematical study of counting. Many arguments involving finite sets rely on the pigeonhole principle, which states that there cannot exist an injective function from a larger finite set to a smaller finite set.

## Definition and terminology

Formally, a set *S* is called **finite** if there exists a bijection

for some natural number *n*. The number *n* is called the cardinality of the set, and is denoted |*S*|. (Note that the empty set is considered finite, with cardinality zero.) If a set is finite, its elements may be written as a sequence:

In combinatorics, a finite set with *n* elements is sometimes called an *n-set* and a subset with *k* elements is called a *k-subset*. For example, the set {5,6,7} is a 3-set, a finite set with three elements, and {6,7} is a 2-subset of it.

## Basic properties

Any proper subset of a finite set *S* is finite and has fewer elements than *S* itself. As a consequence, there cannot exist a bijection between a finite set *S* and a proper subset of *S*. Any set with this property is called Dedekind-finite. Using the standard ZFC axioms for set theory, every Dedekind-finite set is also finite, but this requires the axiom of choice (or at least the axiom of countable choice).

Any injective function between two finite sets of the same cardinality is also a surjection, and similarly any surjection between two finite sets of the same cardinality is also an injection.

The union of two finite sets is finite, with

In fact:

More generally, the union of any finite number of finite sets is finite. The Cartesian product of finite sets is also finite, with:

Similarly, the Cartesian product of finitely many finite sets is finite. A finite set with *n* elements has 2^{n} distinct subsets. That is, the
power set of a finite set is finite, with cardinality 2^{n}.

Any subset of a finite set is finite. The set of values of a function when applied to elements of a finite set is finite.

All finite sets are countable, but not all countable sets are finite. (However, some authors use "countable" to mean "countably infinite", and thus do not consider finite sets to be countable.)

The free semilattice over a finite set is the set of its non-empty subsets, with the join operation being given by set union.

## Necessary and sufficient conditions for finiteness

In Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZF), the following conditions are all equivalent:{{ safesubst:#invoke:Unsubst||date=__DATE__ |$B=
{{#invoke:Category handler|main}}{{#invoke:Category handler|main}}^{[citation needed]}
}}

*S*is a finite set. That is,*S*can be placed into a one-to-one correspondence with the set of those natural numbers less than some specific natural number.- (Kazimierz Kuratowski)
*S*has all properties which can be proved by mathematical induction beginning with the empty set and adding one new element at a time. (See the section on foundational issues for the set-theoretical formulation of Kuratowski finiteness.) - (Paul Stäckel)
*S*can be given a total ordering which is well-ordered both forwards and backwards. That is, every non-empty subset of*S*has both a least and a greatest element in the subset. - Every one-to-one function from P(P(
*S*)) into itself is onto. That is, the powerset of the powerset of*S*is Dedekind-finite (see below). - Every surjective function from P(P(
*S*)) onto itself is one-to-one. - (Alfred Tarski) Every non-empty family of subsets of
*S*has a minimal element with respect to inclusion. *S*can be well-ordered and any two well-orderings on it are order isomorphic. In other words, the well-orderings on*S*have exactly one order type.

If the axiom of choice is also assumed (the axiom of countable choice is sufficient{{ safesubst:#invoke:Unsubst||date=__DATE__ |$B=
{{#invoke:Category handler|main}}{{#invoke:Category handler|main}}^{[citation needed]}
}}), then the following conditions are all equivalent:

*S*is a finite set.- (Richard Dedekind) Every one-to-one function from
*S*into itself is onto. - Every surjective function from
*S*onto itself is one-to-one. *S*is empty or every partial ordering of*S*contains a maximal element.

## Foundational issues

Georg Cantor initiated his theory of sets in order to provide a mathematical treatment of infinite sets. Thus the distinction between the finite and the infinite lies at the core of set theory. Certain foundationalists, the strict finitists, reject the existence of infinite sets and thus advocate a mathematics based solely on finite sets. Mainstream mathematicians consider strict finitism too confining, but acknowledge its relative consistency: the universe of hereditarily finite sets constitutes a model of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of infinity replaced by its negation.

Even for those mathematicians who embrace infinite sets, in certain important contexts, the formal distinction between the finite and the infinite can remain a delicate matter. The difficulty stems from Gödel's incompleteness theorems. One can interpret the theory of hereditarily finite sets within Peano arithmetic (and certainly also vice-versa), so the incompleteness of the theory of Peano arithmetic implies that of the theory of hereditarily finite sets. In particular, there exists a plethora of so-called non-standard models of both theories. A seeming paradox, non-standard models of the theory of hereditarily finite sets contain infinite sets --- but these infinite sets look finite from within the model. (This can happen when the model lacks the sets or functions necessary to witness the infinitude of these sets.) On account of the incompleteness theorems, no first-order predicate, nor even any recursive scheme of first-order predicates, can characterize the standard part of all such models. So, at least from the point of view of first-order logic, one can only hope to characterize finiteness approximately.

More generally, informal notions like set, and particularly finite set, may receive interpretations across a range of formal systems varying in their axiomatics and logical apparatus. The best known axiomatic set theories include Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF), Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZFC), Von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory (NBG), Non-well-founded set theory, Bertrand Russell's Type theory and all the theories of their various models. One may also choose among classical first-order logic, various higher-order logics and intuitionistic logic.

A formalist might see the meaning of *set* varying from system to system. A Platonist might view particular formal systems as approximating an underlying reality.

## Set-theoretic definitions of finiteness

In contexts where the notion of natural number sits logically prior to any notion of set, one can define a set *S* as finite if *S* admits a bijection to some set of natural numbers of the form . Mathematicians more typically choose to ground notions of number in set theory, for example they might model natural numbers by the order types of finite well-ordered sets. Such an approach requires a structural definition of finiteness that does not depend on natural numbers.

Interestingly, various properties that single out the finite sets among all sets in the theory ZFC turn out logically inequivalent in weaker systems such as ZF or intuitionistic set theories. Two definitions feature prominently in the literature, one due to Richard Dedekind, the other to Kazimierz Kuratowski (Kuratowski's is the definition used above).

A set *S* is called Dedekind infinite if there exists an injective, non-surjective function . Such a function exhibits a bijection between *S* and a proper subset of *S*, namely the image of *f*. Given a Dedekind infinite set *S*, a function *f*, and an element *x* that is not in the image of *f*, we can form an infinite sequence of distinct elements of *S*, namely . Conversely, given a sequence in *S* consisting of distinct elements , we can define a function *f* such that on elements in the sequence and *f* behaves like the identity function otherwise. Thus Dedekind infinite sets contain subsets that correspond bijectively with the natural numbers. Dedekind finite naturally means that every injective self-map is also surjective.

Kuratowski finiteness is defined as follows. Given any set *S*, the binary operation of union endows the powerset *P(S)* with the structure of a semi-lattice. Writing *K(S)* for the sub-semi-lattice generated by the empty set and the singletons, call set *S* Kuratowski finite if *S* itself belongs to *K(S)*. Intuitively, *K(S)* consists of the finite subsets of *S*. Crucially, one does not need induction, recursion or a definition of natural numbers to define *generated by* since one may obtain *K(S)* simply by taking the intersection of all sub-semi-lattices containing the empty set and the singletons.

Readers unfamiliar with semi-lattices and other notions of abstract algebra may prefer an entirely elementary formulation. Kuratowski finite means *S* lies in the set *K(S)*, constructed as follows. Write *M* for the set of all subsets *X* of P(*S*) such that:

*X*contains the empty set;- For every set
*T*in P(*S*), if*X*contains*T*then*X*also contains the union of*T*with any singleton.

Then *K(S)* may be defined as the intersection of *M*.

In ZF, Kuratowski finite implies Dedekind finite, but not vice-versa. In the parlance of a popular pedagogical formulation, when the axiom of choice fails badly, one may have an infinite family of socks with no way to choose one sock from more than finitely many of the pairs. That would make the set of such socks Dedekind finite: there can be no infinite sequence of socks, because such a sequence would allow a choice of one sock for infinitely many pairs by choosing the first sock in the sequence. However, Kuratowski finiteness would fail for the same set of socks.

## See also

## References

- {{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=citation }}

- {{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=citation }}

- {{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=citation }}

- {{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=citation }}

- {{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=citation }}

- {{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation

|CitationClass=citation }}