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| {{Multiple issues|context =October 2009|one source =November 2009}}
| | Friends call him Royal. Interviewing is what I do in my day job. Alabama has usually been his house and his family members loves it. To maintain birds is one of the issues he loves most.<br><br>Here is my blog post - extended auto warranty ([http://Mwarrenassociates.com/UserProfile/tabid/253/userId/228462/Default.aspx click the up coming article]) |
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| The '''Zeuthen strategy''' is a negotiation strategy used by some artificial agents. Its purpose is to measure the ''willingness to risk conflict''. An agent will be more willing to risk conflict if the difference in utility between its current proposal and the conflict deal is low.
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| When used by both agents in the [[Monotonic Concession Protocol]], the Zeuthen strategy leads the agents to agree upon the deal in the negotiation set, the set of all conflict free deals which are [[Individually rational]] and [[Pareto optimal]] plus the conflict deal, which maximizes the [[Nash product]].
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| ==Risk==
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| : <math>
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| \text{Risk}(i,t)=
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| \begin{cases}
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| 1 & U_{i}(\delta(i,t))=0 \\
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| \frac{U_{i}(\delta(i,t))-U_{i}(\delta(j,t))}{U_{i}(\delta(i,t))} & \text{otherwise}
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| \end{cases}
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| </math>
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| <br />
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| Risk(A,t) is a measurement of agent A's willingness to risk conflict. The risk function formalizes the notion that an agent's willingness to risk conflict is the ratio of the utility that agent would lose by accepting the other agent's proposal to the utility that agent would lose by causing a conflict. Agent A is said to be using a rational negotiation strategy if at any step ''t'' + 1 that agent A sticks to his last proposal, Risk(A,t) > Risk(B,t).
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| ==Sufficient concession==
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| If agent A makes a sufficient concession in the next step, then, assuming that agent B is using a rational negotiation strategy, if agent B does not concede in the next step, he must do so in the step after that. The set of all sufficient concessions of agent A at step t is denoted SC(''A'', ''t'').
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| ==Minimal sufficient concession==
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| : <math>\delta'=\arg\max_{\delta\in{SC(A,t)}}\{U_{A}(\delta)\}</math>
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| is the minimal sufficient concession of agent A in step t. | |
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| ==Zeuthen strategy==
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| Agent A begins the negotiation by proposing
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| : <math>\delta(A,0)=\arg\max_{\delta\in{NS}}U_{A}(\delta)</math>
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| and will make the minimal sufficient concession in step t+1 if and only if Risk(A,t) ≤ Risk(B,t).
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| '''Theorem'''
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| If both agents are using Zeuthen strategies, then they will agree on
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| : <math>\delta=\arg\max_{\delta'\in{NS}}\{\pi(\delta')\},</math> | |
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| that is, the deal which maximizes the Nash product. (Harsanyi 56)
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| '''Proof'''
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| Let δ<sub>A</sub> = δ(A,t).
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| Let δ<sub>B</sub> = δ(B,t).
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| According to the Zeuthen strategy, agent A will concede at step <math>t</math> if and only if
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| : <math>Risk(A,t)\leq Risk(B,t).</math>
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| That is, if and only if
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| : <math>\frac{U_{A}(\delta_{A})-U_{A}(\delta_{B})}{U_{A}(\delta_{A})}\leq \frac{U_{B}(\delta_{B})-U_{B}(\delta_{A})}{U_{B}(\delta_{B})}</math>
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| : <math>U_{B}(\delta_{B})(U_{A}(\delta_{A})-U_{A}(\delta_{B}))\leq
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| U_{A}(\delta_{A})(U_{B}(\delta_{B})-U_{B}(\delta_{A}))</math>
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| : <math>U_{A}(\delta_{A})U_{B}(\delta_{B})-U_{A}(\delta_{B})U_{B}(\delta_{B})\leq
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| U_{A}(\delta_{A})U_{B}(\delta_{B})-U_{A}(\delta_{A})U_{B}(\delta_{A})</math>
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| : <math>-U_{A}(\delta_{B})U_{B}(\delta_{B})\leq -U_{A}(\delta_{A})U_{B}(\delta_{A})</math>
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| : <math>U_{A}(\delta_{A}) U_{B}(\delta_{A})\leq U_{A}(\delta_{B}) U_{B}(\delta_{B})</math>
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| : <math>\pi(\delta_{A})\leq \pi(\delta_{B})</math>
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| Thus, Agent A will concede if and only if <math>\delta_{A}</math> does not yield the larger product of utilities.
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| Therefore, the Zeuthen strategy guarantees a final agreement that maximizes the Nash Product.
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| ==References==
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| {{reflist}}
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| * {{cite book
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| |title= Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers Artificial intelligence – The MIT Press series in artificial intelligence
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| |last= Rosenschein & Zlotkin
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| |first=
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| |authorlink=
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| |coauthors= Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Gilad Zlotkin
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| |year= 1994
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| |publisher= MIT Press
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| |location=
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| |isbn= 0-262-18159-2
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| |page=
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| |pages= 229
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| |url= http://books.google.com/books?id=4ZhPMk3ftpoC&dq=Zeuthen+Strategy&client=firefox-a&source=gbs_navlinks_s}}
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| [[Category:Artificial intelligence]]
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| [[Category:Economics]]
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Friends call him Royal. Interviewing is what I do in my day job. Alabama has usually been his house and his family members loves it. To maintain birds is one of the issues he loves most.
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