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| {{Distinguish|linguistic philosophy}}
| | Yoshiko is her name but she doesn't like when individuals use her complete title. His car [http://roki-gaming.de/index.php?mod=users&action=view&id=371 extended auto warranty] day occupation is a [http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/consumer-rights-and-resources/autos/lemon-laws/used-vehicle-warranty-law.html cashier] and his salary has been truly [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warranty fulfilling]. I currently live in Arizona but now I'm [http://c-lug.com/Activity-Feed/My-Profile/UserId/249456 extended auto warranty] warranty considering other options. Her [http://www.Mass.gov/ocabr/consumer-rights-and-resources/autos/lemon-laws/used-vehicle-warranty-law.html buddies] say it's not great for her but what she enjoys doing is flower arranging car warranty and she is trying to make it a occupation.<br><br>My weblog; [http://www.uniqueindia.org/groups/the-hidden-tips-and-secrets-to-auto-repair/ www.uniqueindia.org] |
| '''Philosophy of language''' is concerned with four central problems: the nature of [[Meaning (philosophy of language)|meaning]], [[Context (language use)|language use]], language [[cognition]], and the relationship between language and [[reality]]. For [[Continental philosophy|continental philosopher]]s, however, the philosophy of language tends to be dealt with, not as a separate topic, but as a part of [[logic]] (see the section "Language and continental philosophy" below).
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| First and foremost, philosophers of language prioritize their inquiry on the ''nature'' of meaning. They seek to explain what it means to "mean" something. Topics in that vein include the nature of [[synonymy]], the origins of meaning itself, and how any meaning can ever really be known. Another project under this heading of special interest to analytic philosophers of language is the investigation into the manner in which sentences are ''composed'' into a meaningful whole out of the meaning of its ''parts''.
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| Secondly, they seek to better understand what speakers and listeners do with language in [[communication]], and how it is used socially. Specific interests may include the topics of [[Language acquisition|language learning]], language creation, and [[speech act]]s.
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| Thirdly, they would like to know how language relates to the minds of both the speaker and the [[Language interpretation|interpreter]]. Of specific interest is the grounds for successful [[translation]] of words into other words.
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| Finally, philosophers of language investigate how language and meaning relate to [[truth]] and [[Reference|the world]]. They tend to be less concerned with which sentences are ''actually true'', and more with ''what kinds of meanings can be true or false''. A truth-oriented philosopher of language might wonder whether or not a meaningless sentence can be true or false, or whether or not sentences can express propositions about things that do not exist, rather than the way sentences are used.
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| ==Major topics and sub-fields==
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| ===Composition and parts===
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| {{Philosophy-of-language-key-terms}}<br />
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| It has long been known that there are different [[parts of speech]]. One part of the common sentence is the [[lexical word]], which is composed of [[nouns]], verbs, and adjectives. A major question in the field – perhaps the single most important question for [[Formalism (philosophy)|formalist]] and [[structuralism|structuralist]] thinkers – is, "How does the meaning of a sentence emerge out of its parts?"
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| [[File:syntactic-semantic trees.gif|left|230px]]
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| Many aspects of the problem of the composition of sentences are addressed in the field of linguistics of [[syntax]]. Philosophical semantics tends to focus on the [[principle of compositionality]] to explain the relationship between meaningful parts and whole sentences. The principle of compositionality asserts that a sentence can be understood on the basis of the meaning of the ''parts'' of the sentence (i.e., words, morphemes) along with an understanding of its ''structure'' (i.e., syntax, logic).<ref>Pagin, P. "Are Holism and Compositionality Compatible?" In ''Olismo''. ed. Massimo dell'Utri. Macerata:Quodlibet. 2002. ISBN 88-86570-85-6</ref>
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| It is possible to use the concept of ''functions'' to describe more than just how lexical meanings work: they can also be used to describe the meaning of a sentence. Take, for a moment, the sentence "The horse is red". We may consider "the horse" to be the product of a ''[[propositional function]]''. A propositional function is an operation of language that takes an entity (in this case, the horse) as an input and outputs a ''semantic fact'' (i.e., the proposition that is represented by "The horse is red"). In other words, a propositional function is like an algorithm. The meaning of "red" in this case is whatever takes the entity "the horse" and turns it into the statement, "The horse is red."<ref name="Stainton">Stainton, Robert J. (1996). Philosophical perspectives on language. Peterborough, Ont., Broadview Press.</ref>
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| Linguists have developed at least two general methods of understanding the relationship between the parts of a linguistic string and how it is put together: syntactic and semantic trees. [[Syntax|Syntactic]] trees draw upon the words of a sentence with the ''[[grammar]]'' of the sentence in mind. [[Semantics|Semantic]] trees, on the other hand, focus upon the role of the ''meaning'' of the words and how those meanings combine to provide insight onto the genesis of semantic facts.
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| ===Nature of meaning===
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| {{Main|Meaning (linguistic)}}...
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| Generally speaking, there have been at least seven distinctive explanations of what a [[Meaning (linguistics)|linguistic "meaning"]] is. Each has been associated with its own body of literature.
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| # ''Idea theories of meaning'', most commonly associated with the British [[empiricism|empiricist]] tradition of [[John Locke|Locke]], [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]] and [[David Hume|Hume]], claim that meanings are purely mental contents provoked by signs.<ref>Penco, C. "Filosofia del Linguaggio". In
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| ''Enciclopedia Garzantina della Filosofia''. ed. Gianni Vattimo. 2004. Milian:Garzanti Editori. ISBN 88-11-50515-1</ref> Although this view of meaning has been beset by a number of problems from the beginning (see the main article for details), interest in it has been renewed by some contemporary theorists under the guise of ''semantic internalism''.<ref>Block, Ned. "Conceptual Role Semantics." ''The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Forthcoming. [http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/ConceptualRoleSemantics.html]</ref>
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| # ''Truth-conditional theories'' hold meaning to be the conditions under which an expression may be true or false. This tradition goes back at least to [[Gottlob Frege|Frege]] and is associated with a rich body of modern work, spearheaded by philosophers like [[Alfred Tarski]] and [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]].<ref name="Tarsk">Tarski, Alfred. (1944). ''The Semantical Conception of Truth''. [http://www.ditext.com/tarski/tarski.html online PDF]</ref><ref name="TandI">Davidson, D. (2001) ''Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation''. Oxford:Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-924629-7</ref>
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| # ''Theories of language use'', for example theories by the later [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]], helped inaugurate the idea of "meaning as use", and a communitarian view of language. Wittgenstein was interested in the way in which the communities use language, and how far it can be taken.<ref name="LW">Wittgenstein, L. (1958) ''Philosophical Investigations''. Third edition. trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. New York:MacMillan Publishing Co.</ref> It is also associated with [[P. F. Strawson]], [[John Searle]], [[Robert Brandom]], and others.<ref name="Brand">Brandom, R. (1994) ''Making it Explicit''. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-54330-0</ref>
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| # ''[[Constructivist epistemology|Constructivist]]'' theories of language are connected to the revolutionary idea claiming that [[speech]] is not only passively describing a given reality, but it can change the (social) reality it is describing through [[speech act]]s, which for linguistics was as revolutionary a discovery as for [[physics]] was the discovery that [[measurement]] itself can change the measured reality itself. [[Speech act]] theory was developed by [[J. L. Austin]], although other previous thinkers have had similar ideas.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Kordić, Snježana |authorlink=Snježana Kordić |title=Filozofija jezika i pragmatika |trans_title=Philosophy of language and pragmatics |url=http://bib.irb.hr/datoteka/446878.rec_PUPOVAC.PDF |language=Serbo-Croatian |journal=Revija |volume=30 |issue=7 |page= 99 |year=1990 |issn=0034-6888 |archivedate=10 September 2012| archiveurl=http://www.webcitation.org/6AZGjjiCD |accessdate=10 September 2012}}</ref>
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| # ''Reference theories of meaning'', also known collectively as ''semantic [[externalism]]'', view meaning to be equivalent to those things in the world that are actually connected to signs. There are two broad subspecies of externalism: social and environmental. The first is most closely associated with [[Tyler Burge]] and the second with [[Hilary Putnam]], [[Saul Kripke]] and others.<ref>Burge, Tyler. 1979. Individualism and the Mental. ''Midwest Studies in Philosophy'' 4: 73-121.</ref><ref>Putnam, H. (1975) [http://internalism.googlegroups.com/web/Putnam%20-%20The%20meaning%20of%20%27meaning%27.pdf?gda=twdJY1oAAABFSTngQf24Sy1RD7yNn1iVgy3Odg0ZctAT1N_Bh2qhdGG1qiJ7UbTIup-M2XPURDQe1sJTwbuelxnpaL6JzH4yeFMfiRQRvg6UTOJgQe0faGtRc9Sp7hcxNJ_gjwZr8bQ "The Meaning of 'Meaning'"]. In ''Language, Mind and Knowledge''. ed. K. Gunderson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 88-459-0257-9</ref><ref name="SK">Kripke, S. (1980) ''Naming and Necessity''. Oxford:Basil Blackwell. ISBN 88-339-1135-7</ref>
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| # ''Verificationist theories of meaning'' are generally associated with the early 20th century movement of [[logical positivism]]. The traditional formulation of such a theory is that the meaning of a sentence is its method of verification or falsification. In this form, the thesis was abandoned after the acceptance by most philosophers of the [[Duhem–Quine thesis]] of [[confirmation holism]] after the publication of [[W.V.O. Quine|Quine]]'s ''Two Dogmas of Empiricism''.<ref>Voltolini, A. (2002) "Olismi Irriducibilmente Indipendenti?". In ''Olismo'' ed. Massimo Dell'Utri. Macerata: Quodlibet. ISBN 88-86570-85-6</ref> However, [[Michael Dummett]] has advocated a modified form of verificationism since the 1970s. In this version, the ''comprehension'' (and hence meaning) of a sentence consists in the hearer's ability to recognize the demonstration (mathematical, empirical or other) of the truth of the sentence.<ref name="Dummett">Dummett, M. (1991) ''The Logical Basis of Metaphysics''. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. ISBN 88-15-05669-6</ref>
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| # A ''pragmatist theory of meaning'' is any theory in which the meaning (or understanding) of a sentence is determined by the consequences of its application. Dummett attributes such a theory of meaning to [[Charles Sanders Peirce]] and other early 20th century [[American philosophy|American]] pragmatists.<ref name="Dummett" />
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| Other theories exist to discuss [[Meaning (non-linguistic)|non-linguistic meaning]] (i.e., meaning as conveyed by body language, meanings as consequences, etc.)<ref>Grice, Paul. "Meaning". ''Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language.'' (2000) ed. Robert Stainton.</ref>
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| ===References===
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| Investigations into how language interacts with the world are called ''theories of reference''. [[Gottlob Frege]] was an advocate of a [[mediated reference theory]]. Frege divided the semantic content of every expression, including sentences, into two components:
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| sense and meaning. The sense of a sentence is the thought that it expresses. Such a thought is abstract, universal and objective. The sense of any sub-sentential expression consists in its contribution to the thought that its embedding sentence expresses. Senses determine reference and are also the modes of presentation of the objects to which expressions refer. Referents are the objects in the world that words pick out. The senses of sentences are thoughts, while their referents are [[truth value]]s (true or false). The referents of sentences embedded in [[propositional attitude]] ascriptions and other opaque contexts are their usual senses.<ref name="GF">Frege, G. (1892) "On Sense and Reference". In ''Frege:Senso, Funzione e Concetto''. eds. Eva Picardi and Carlo Penco. Bari: Editori Laterza. 2001. ISBN 88-420-6347-9</ref>
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| [[Bertrand Russell]], in his later writings and for reasons related to his theory of acquaintance in [[epistemology]], held that the only directly referential expressions are, what he called, "logically proper names". Logically proper names are such terms as ''I'', ''now'', ''here'' and other [[indexical]]s.<ref>Stanley, Jason. (2006). [http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jasoncs/routledge.pdf Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century]. Forthcoming in the Routledge Guide to Twentieth Century Philosophy.</ref><ref>Gaynesford, M. de ''I: The Meaning of the First Person Term'', Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Maximilian_de_Gaynesford</ref> He viewed proper names of the sort described above as "abbreviated definite descriptions". Hence ''Barack H. Obama'' may be an abbreviation for "the current President of the United States and husband of Michelle Obama". Definite descriptions are denoting phrases (see [[On Denoting]]) which are analyzed by Russell into existentially quantified logical constructions. Such phrases denote in the sense that there is an object that satisfies the description. However, such objects are not to be considered meaningful on their own, but have meaning only in the [[proposition]] expressed by the sentences of which they are a part. Hence, they are not directly referential in the same way as logically proper names, for Russell.<ref>Russell, B. (1905) ''On Denoting''. Published in "Mind".[http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Russell/denoting/ online text], Neale, Stephen (1990) Descriptions, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.</ref><ref>Russell, B. (1903) ''I Principi della Matematica''. Original title: ''The Principles of Mathematics''. Italian trans. by Enrico Carone and Maurizio Destro. Rome:Newton Compton editori. 1971. ISBN 88-8183-730-7</ref>
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| On Frege's account, any [[referring expression]] has a sense as well as a referent. Such a "mediated reference" view has certain theoretical advantages over Mill's view. For example, co-referential names, such as ''Samuel Clemens'' and ''Mark Twain'', cause problems for a directly referential view because it is possible for someone to hear "Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens" and be surprised – thus, their cognitive content seems different.
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| Despite the differences between the views of Frege and Russell, they are generally lumped together as [[Descriptivist theory of names|descriptivists]] about proper names. Such descriptivism was criticized in [[Saul Kripke]]'s ''Naming and Necessity''.
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| Kripke put forth what has come to be known as "the modal argument" (or "argument from rigidity"). Consider the name ''Aristotle'' and the descriptions "the greatest student of Plato", "the founder of logic" and "the teacher of Alexander". [[Aristotle]] obviously satisfies all of the descriptions (and many of the others we commonly associate with him), but it is not [[logical truth|necessarily true]] that if Aristotle existed then Aristotle was any one, or all, of these descriptions. Aristotle may well have existed without doing any single one of the things for which he is known to posterity. He may have existed and not have become known to posterity at all or he may have died in infancy. Suppose that Aristotle is associated by Mary with the description “the last great philosopher of antiquity” and (the actual) Aristotle died in infancy. Then Mary’s description would seem to refer to Plato. But this is deeply counterintuitive. Hence, names are ''[[rigid designator]]s'', according to Kripke. That is, they refer to the same individual in every possible world in which that individual exists. In the same work, Kripke articulated several other arguments against "Frege-Russell" descriptivism.<ref name="SK" />
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| === Mind and language ===
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| ==== Innateness and learning ====
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| Some of the major issues at the intersection of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind are also dealt with in modern [[psycholinguistics]]. Some important questions are ''How much of language is innate? Is language acquisition a special faculty in the mind? What is the connection between thought and language?''
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| There are three general perspectives on the issue of language learning. The first is the [[behaviorist]] perspective, which dictates that not only is the solid bulk of language learned, but it is learned via conditioning. The second is the ''hypothesis testing perspective'', which understands the child's learning of syntactic rules and meanings to involve the postulation and testing of hypotheses, through the use of the general faculty of intelligence. The final candidate for explanation is the [[Psychological nativism|innatist]] perspective, which states that at least some of the syntactic settings are innate and hardwired, based on certain modules of the mind.<ref name="Fodor">{{cite book |author=Fodor, Jerry A. |title=The Modularity of Mind:An Essay in Faculty Psychology |year= 1983 |publisher=The MIT Press |isbn=0-262-56025-9}}</ref><ref name="SP">Pinker, S. (1994) ''L'Istinto del Linguaggio''. Original title: ''The Language Instinct''. 1997. Milan:Arnaldo Mondadori Editori. ISBN 88-04-45350-8</ref>
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| There are varying notions of the structure of the brain when it comes to language. [[Connectionism|Connectionist]] models emphasize the idea that a person's lexicon and their thoughts operate in a kind of distributed, [[associationism|associative]] network.<ref>Churchland, P. (1995) Engine of Reason, Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey Into the Brain. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.</ref> [[Psychological nativism|Nativist model]]s assert that there are [[language acquisition device|specialized devices]] in the brain that are dedicated to language acquisition.<ref name="SP" /> [[Computationalism|Computation]] models emphasize the notion of a representational [[language of thought]] and the logic-like, computational processing that the mind performs over them.<ref>Fodor, J and E. Lepore. (1999) "All at Sea in Semantic Space: Churchland on Meaning Similarity." Journal of Philosophy 96, 381-403.</ref> [[Emergentism|Emergentist]] models focus on the notion that natural faculties are a complex system that emerge from simpler biological parts. [[Reductionism|Reductionist]] models attempt to explain higher-level mental processes in terms of the basic low-level neurophysiological activity of the brain.<ref>Hofstadter,D.R. (1979)''Godel, Escher, Bach:An Eternal Golden Braid''. New York:Random House. ISBN 0-394-74502-7</ref>
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| ==== Language and thought ====
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| An important problem which touches both philosophy of language and [[philosophy of mind]] is to what extent language influences thought and vice-versa. There have been a number of different perspectives on this issue, each offering a number of insights and suggestions.
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| Linguists [[Linguistic relativity|Sapir and Whorf]] suggested that language limited the extent to which members of a "linguistic community" can think about certain subjects (a hypothesis paralleled in [[George Orwell]]'s novel ''[[Nineteen Eighty-Four]]'').<ref>Kay, P. and W. Kempton. 1984. "What is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?" American Anthropologist 86(1): 65-79.</ref> In other words, language was analytically prior to thought. Philosopher [[Michael Dummett]] is also a proponent of the "language-first" viewpoint.<ref name=BlackwellPhil>{{cite book|title=The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy|author=Bunnin, Nicholas and E. P. Tsui-James|publisher=Blackwell|location=Oxford|pages=97, 120–121}}</ref>
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| The stark opposite to the Sapir–Whorf position is the notion that thought (or, more broadly, mental content) has priority over language. The "knowledge-first" position can be found, for instance, in the work of [[Paul Grice]].<ref name="BlackwellPhil" /> Further, this view is closely associated with [[Jerry Fodor]] and his [[language of thought]] hypothesis. According to his argument, spoken and written language derive their intentionality and meaning from an internal language encoded in the mind.<ref name="LOT">Fodor, J. ''The Language of Thought'', Harvard University Press, 1975, ISBN 0-674-51030-5.</ref> The main argument in favor of such a view is that the structure of thoughts and the structure of language seem to share a compositional, systematic character. Another argument is that it is difficult to explain how signs and symbols on paper can represent anything meaningful unless some sort of meaning is infused into them by the contents of the mind. One of the main arguments against is that such levels of language can lead to an infinite regress.<ref name="LOT" /> In any case, many philosophers of mind and language, such as [[Ruth Millikan]], [[Fred Dretske]] and Fodor, have recently turned their attention to explaining the meanings of mental contents and states directly.
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| Another tradition of philosophers has attempted to show that language and thought are coextensive – that there is no way of explaining one without the other. Donald Davidson, in his essay "Thought and Talk", argued that the notion of belief could only arise as a product of public linguistic interaction. [[Daniel Dennett]] holds a similar ''interpretationist'' view of [[propositional attitude]]s.<ref>Gozzano, S. "Olismo, Razionalità e Interpretazione". In ''Olismo'' ed. Massimo dell'Utri. 2002. Macerata:Quodlibet. ISBN 88-86570-85-6</ref> To an extent, the theoretical underpinnings to [[cognitive semantics]] (including the notion of semantic [[framing (social sciences)|framing]]) suggest the influence of language upon thought.<ref>Lakoff, G. (1987) ''Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind''. Chicago:University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-46804-6.</ref> However, the same tradition views meaning and grammar as a function of conceptualization, making it difficult to assess in any straightfoward way.
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| Some thinkers, like the ancient sophist [[Gorgias]], have questioned whether or not language was capable of capturing thought at all.
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| {{cquote|...speech can never exactly represent perciptibles, since it is different from them, and perceptibles are apprehended each by the one kind of organ, speech by another. Hence, since the objects of sight cannot be presented to any other organ but sight, and the different sense-organs cannot give their information to one another, similarly speech cannot give any information about perceptibles. Therefore, if anything exists and is comprehended, it is incommunicable.<ref>Giorgias (c. 375 BCE) translated by Kathleen Freeman. In Kaufmann, W. ''Philosophic Classics: Thales to Ockham''. New Jersey:Prentice Hall, Inc. 1961, 1968.</ref>}}
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| There are studies that prove that languages shape how people understand causality. Some of them were performed by [[Lera Boroditsky]]. For example, English speakers tend to say things like "John broke the vase" even for accidents. However, [[Spanish language|Spanish]] or [[Japanese language|Japanese]] speakers would be more likely to say "the vase broke itself." In studies conducted by Caitlin Fausey at [[Stanford University]] speakers of English, Spanish and Japanese watched videos of two people popping balloons, breaking eggs and spilling drinks either intentionally or accidentally. Later everyone was asked whether they could remember who did what. Spanish and Japanese speakers did not remember the agents of accidental events as well as did English speakers.<ref>http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/Proceedings/2009/papers/559/paper559.pdf</ref> In another study, English speakers watched the video of [[Janet Jackson]]'s infamous "[[wardrobe malfunction]]", accompanied by one of two written reports. The reports were identical except in the last sentence where one used the agentive phrase "ripped the costume" while the other said "the costume ripped." The people who read "ripped the costume" blamed [[Justin Timberlake]] more.{{Citation needed|date=July 2011}}
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| [[Russian language|Russian]] speakers, who make an extra distinction between light and dark blue in their language, are better able to visually discriminate shades of blue. The [[Pirahã people|Piraha]], a tribe in [[Brazil]], whose language has only terms like few and many instead of numerals, are not able to keep track of exact quantities.<ref>{{cite web|last=Boroditsky |first=Lera |url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383131592767868.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_MIDDLETopNews#printMode |title=Lost in Translation. New cognitive research suggests that language profoundly influences the way people see the world; a different sense of blame in Japanese and Spanish by Lera Boroditsky |publisher=Online.wsj.com |date=2010-07-23 |accessdate=2011-12-10}}</ref>
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| In one study German and Spanish speakers were asked to describe objects having opposite [[gender]] assignment in those two languages. The descriptions they gave differed in a way predicted by [[grammatical gender]]. For example, when asked to describe a "key" — a word that is masculine in German and feminine in Spanish — the [[German language|German]] speakers were more likely to use words like "hard," "heavy," "jagged," "metal," "serrated," and "useful," whereas Spanish speakers were more likely to say "golden," "intricate," "little," "lovely," "shiny," and "tiny." To describe a "bridge," which is feminine in German and masculine in Spanish, the German speakers said "beautiful," "elegant," "fragile," "peaceful," "pretty," and "slender," and the Spanish speakers said "big," "dangerous," "long," "strong," "sturdy," and "towering." This was the case even though all testing was done in English, a language without grammatical gender.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/boroditsky09/boroditsky09_index.html |title=How Does Our Language Shape The Way We Think? |publisher=Edge.org |date= |accessdate=2011-12-10}}</ref>
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| In a series of studies conducted by Gary Lupyan, people were asked to look at a series of images of imaginary aliens.<ref>http://sapir.psych.wisc.edu/papers/lupyan_rakison_mcClelland_2007.pdf</ref> Whether each alien was friendly or hostile was determined by certain subtle features but participants were not told what these were. They had to guess whether each alien was friendly or hostile, and after each response they were told if they were correct or not, helping them learn the subtle cues that distinguished friend from foe. A quarter of the participants were told in advance that the friendly aliens were called "leebish" and the hostile ones "grecious", while another quarter were told the opposite. For the rest, the aliens remained nameless. It was found that participants who were given names for the aliens learned to categorize the aliens far more quickly, reaching 80 per cent accuracy in less than half the time taken by those not told the names. By the end of the test, those told the names could correctly categorize 88 per cent of aliens, compared to just 80 per cent for the rest. It was concluded that naming objects helps us categorize and memorize them.
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| In another series of experiments <ref>https://mywebspace.wisc.edu/lupyan/web/lupyan_2008_jepG.pdf</ref> a group of people was asked to view furniture from an [[IKEA]] catalog. Half the time they were asked to label the object - whether it was a chair or lamp, for example - while the rest of the time they had to say whether or not they liked it. It was found that when asked to label items, people were later less likely to recall the specific details of products, such as whether a chair had arms or not. It was concluded that labeling objects helps our minds build a prototype of the typical object in the group at the expense of individual features.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20727761.500-whats-in-a-name-the-words-behind-thought.html?full=true |title=What's in a name? The words behind thought by David Robson |publisher=Newscientist.com |date=2010-09-06 |accessdate=2011-12-10}}</ref>
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| === Social interaction and language ===
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| A common claim is that language is governed by social conventions. Questions inevitably arise on surrounding topics. One question is, "What exactly is a convention, and how do we study it?", and second, "To what extent do conventions even matter in the study of language?" [[David Kellogg Lewis]] proposed a worthy reply to the first question by expounding the view that a convention is a ''rationally self-perpetuating regularity in behavior''. However, this view seems to compete to some extent with the Gricean view of speaker's meaning, requiring either one (or both) to be weakened if both are to be taken as true.<ref name=BlackwellPhil />
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| Some have questioned whether or not conventions are relevant to the study of meaning at all. [[Noam Chomsky]] proposed that the study of language could be done in terms of the I-Language, or internal language of persons. If this is so, then it undermines the pursuit of explanations in terms of conventions, and relegates such explanations to the domain of "meta-semantics". ''Metasemantics'' is a term used by philosopher of language Robert Stainton to describe all those fields that attempt to explain how semantic facts arise.<ref name="Stainton" /> One fruitful source of research involves investigation into the social conditions that give rise to, or are associated with, meanings and languages. ''[[Etymology]]'' (the study of the origins of words) and ''[[Stylistics (linguistics)|stylistics]]'' (philosophical argumentation over what makes "good grammar", relative to a particular language) are two other examples of fields that are taken to be meta-semantic.
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| Not surprisingly, many separate (but related) fields have investigated the topic of linguistic convention within their own research paradigms. The presumptions that prop up each theoretical view are of interest to the philosopher of language. For instance, one of the major fields of sociology, [[symbolic interactionism]], is based on the insight that human social organization is based almost entirely on the use of meanings.<ref>Teevan, James J. and W.E. Hewitt. (2001) Introduction to Sociology: A Canadian Focus. Prentice Hall: Toronto. p.10</ref> In consequence, any explanation of a [[social structure]] (like an [[institution]]) would need to account for the shared meanings which create and sustain the structure.
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| [[Rhetoric]] is the study of the particular words that people use to achieve the proper emotional and rational effect in the listener, be it to persuade, provoke, endear, or teach. Some relevant applications of the field include the examination of [[propaganda]] and [[didactic]]ism, the examination of the purposes of [[Profanity|swearing]] and [[pejorative]]s (especially how it influences the behavior of others, and defines relationships), or the effects of gendered language. It can also be used to study [[linguistic transparency]] (or speaking in an accessible manner), as well as [[performative]] utterances and the various tasks that language can perform (called "speech acts"). It also has applications to the study and interpretation of law, and helps give insight to the logical concept of the [[domain of discourse]].
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| [[Literary theory]] is a discipline that some literary theorists claim overlaps with the philosophy of language. It emphasizes the methods that readers and critics use in understanding a text. This field, an outgrowth of the study of how to properly interpret messages, is unsurprisingly closely tied to the ancient discipline of [[hermeneutics]].
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| ==Language and continental philosophy==
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| In [[continental philosophy]], language is not studied as a separate discipline, as it is in [[analytic philosophy]]. Rather, it is an inextricable part of many other areas of thought, such as [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], [[semiotics]], [[hermeneutics]], Heideggerean [[ontology]], [[existentialism]], [[structuralism]], [[deconstruction]] and [[critical theory]]. The idea of language is often related to that of logic in its Greek sense as "Logos", meaning discourse or dialectic. Language and concepts are also seen as having been formed by history and politics, or even by historical philosophy itself.
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| The field of hermeneutics, and the theory of interpretation in general, has played a significant role in 20th century [[continental philosophy]] of language and [[ontology]] beginning with [[Martin Heidegger]]. Heidegger combines phenomenology with the hermeneutics of [[Wilhelm Dilthey]]. Heidegger believed language was one of the most important concepts for ''[[Dasein]]'': "Language is the house of being, which is propriated by being and pervaded by being."<ref>Heidegger, Martin.(1998) ''Pathmarks''. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-43968-X</ref> However, Heidegger believed that language today is worn out because of overuse of important words, and would be inadequate for in-depth study of Being (''Sein''). For example, ''Sein'' (''being''), the word itself, is saturated with multiple meanings. Thus, he invented new vocabulary and [[Stylistics (linguistics)|linguistic styles]], based on [[Ancient Greek]] and [[Germanic language|Germanic]] [[Etymology|etymological]] word relations, to disambiguate commonly used words. He avoided words like consciousness, ego, human, nature, etc. and instead talked holistically of [[Being-in-the-world]], [[Dasein]].
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| With such new concepts as ''Being-in-the-world'', Heidegger constructs his theory of language, centered on [[Speech communication|speech]]. He believed speech (talking, listening, silence) was the most essential and pure form of language. Heidegger claims writing is only a supplement to speech, because even a reader constructs or contributes one's own "talk" while reading. The most important feature of language is its ''projectivity'', the idea that language is prior to human speech. This means that when one is "thrown" into the world, his existence is characterized from the beginning by a certain pre-comprehension of the world. However, it is only after naming, or "articulation of intelligibility", can one have primary access to ''Dasein'' and ''Being-in-the-World''.<ref name="Being">Heidegger, Martin.(1996) ''Being and Time''. New York: Blackwell, ISBN 0-631-19770-2</ref>
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| [[Hans-Georg Gadamer]] expanded on these ideas of Heidegger and proposed a complete hermeneutic ontology. In ''Truth and Method'', Gadamer describes language as "the medium in which substantive understanding and agreement take place between two people."<ref name="Gadamer">Gadamer, Hans G. (1989)''Truth and Method'', New York:Crossroad, 2nd ed., ISBN 0-8264-0401-4</ref> In addition, Gadamer claims that the world is linguistically constituted, and cannot exist apart from language. For example, monuments and statues cannot communicate without the aid of language. Gadamer also claims that every language constitutes a world-view, because the linguistic nature of the world frees each individual from an objective environment: "... the fact that we have a world at all depends upon [language] and presents itself in it. The world as world exists for man as for no other creature in the world."<ref name="Gadamer" />
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| [[Paul Ricœur]], on the other hand, proposed a hermeneutics which, reconnecting with the original Greek sense of the term, emphasized the discovery of hidden meanings in the equivocal terms (or "symbols") of [[ordinary language]]. Other philosophers who have worked in this tradition include [[Luigi Pareyson]] and [[Jacques Derrida]].<ref name="Volli">Volli,U. (2000) ''Manuale di Semiotica''. Rome-Bari:Editori Laterza. ISBN 88-420-5953-6</ref>
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| [[Semiotics]] is the study of the transmission, reception and meaning of signs and symbols in general. In this field, human language (both natural and artificial) is just one among many ways that humans (and other conscious beings) are able to communicate. It allows them to take advantage of and effectively manipulate the external world in order to create meaning for themselves and transmit this meaning to others. Every object, every person, every event, and every force communicates (or ''signifies'') continuously. The ringing of a telephone for example, ''is'' the telephone. The smoke that I see on the horizon is the sign that there is a fire. The smoke signifies. The things of the world, in this vision, seem to be ''labeled'' precisely for intelligent beings who only need to interpret them in the way that humans do. Everything has meaning. True communication, including the use of human language, however, requires someone (a ''sender'') who sends a ''message'', or ''text'', in some code to someone else (a ''receiver''). Language is studied only insofar as it is one of these forms (the most sophisticated form) of communication. Some important figures in the history of semiotics, are [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], [[Roland Barthes]], and [[Roman Jakobson]]. In modern times, its best-known figures include [[Umberto Eco]], [[A.J. Greimas]], [[Louis Hjelmslev]], and [[Tullio De Mauro]].<ref name="Volli" /> Investigations on signs in non-human communications are subject to [[biosemiotics]], a field founded in the late 20th century by [[Thomas Sebeok]] and Thure von Uexkuell.
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| ==Problems in philosophy of language==
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| ===Vagueness===
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| One issue that has bothered philosophers of language and logic is the problem of the [[vagueness]] of words. The specific instances of vagueness that most interest philosophers of language are those where the existence of "borderline cases" make it seemingly impossible to say whether a predicate is true or false of them. Classic examples are "is tall" or "is bald", where it can't be said that some borderline case (some given person) is tall or not-tall. In consequence, vagueness gives rise to the [[Paradox of the heap]]. Many theorists have attempted to solve the paradox by way of n-valued logics, such as [[fuzzy logic]], which have radically departed from classical two-valued logics.<ref>Sorensen, Roy. (2006) "Vagueness". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness/#3</ref>
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| === Problem of universals and composition ===
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| {{Further|problem of universals}}
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| One debate that has captured the interest of many philosophers is the debate over the meaning of ''[[universals]]''. One might ask, for example, "When people say the word ''rocks'', what is it that the word represents?" Two different answers have emerged to this question. Some have said that the expression stands for some real, abstract universal out in the world called "rocks". Others have said that the word stands for some collection of particular, individual rocks that we associate with merely a nominclature. The former position has been called ''[[philosophical realism]]'', and the latter ''[[nominalism]]''.<ref>{{ws|"[[s:Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)/Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism|Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism]]" in the 1913 ''Catholic Encyclopedia''}}</ref>
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| The issue here can be explicated if we examine the proposition "Socrates is a Man".
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| From the radical realist's perspective, the connection between S and M is a connection between two abstract entities. There is an entity, "man", and an entity, "Socrates". These two things connect in some way or overlap.
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| From a nominalist's perspective, the connection between S and M is the connection between a particular entity (Socrates) and a vast collection of particular things (men). To say that Socrates is a man is to say that Socrates is a part of the class of "men". Another perspective is to consider "man" to be a ''property'' of the entity, "Socrates".
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| There is a third way, between nominalism and radical realism, usually called "moderate realism" and attributed to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Moderate realists hold that "man" refers to a real essence or form that is really present and identical in Socrates and all other men, but "man" does not exist as a separate and distinct entity. This is a realist position, because "Man" is real, insofar as it really exists in all men; but it is a moderate realism, because "Man" is not an entity separate from the men it informs.
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| === Nature of language ===
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| Many philosophical discussions of language begin by clarifying terminology. One item which has undergone significant scrutiny is the idea of language itself. Those philosophers who have set themselves to the task ask two important questions: "What is language in general?" and "What is a particular, individual language?"
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| Some [[semiotic]] outlooks have stressed that language is the mere manipulation and use of symbols in order to draw attention to signified content. If this were so, then humans would not be the sole possessors of language skills.<ref name="Volli" /> On the other hand, many works by linguist [[Noam Chomsky]] have emphasized the role of syntax as a characteristic of any language.<ref>Chomsky, N. (1985)''The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory/'' Chicago: University of Chicago Press</ref>
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| More puzzling is the question of what it is that distinguishes one particular language from another. What is it that makes "English" English? What's the difference between Spanish and French? Chomsky has indicated that the search for what it means to be a language must begin with the study of the internal language of persons, or [[I-language]]s, which are based upon certain rules (or principles and parameters) which generate grammars. This view is supported in part by the conviction that there is no clear, general, and principled difference between one language and the next, and which may apply across the field of all languages. Other attempts, which he dubs ''E-languages,'' have tried to explain a language as usage within a specific speech community with a specific set of well-formed utterances in mind (markedly associated with linguists like Bloomfield).<ref>Chomsky, Noam. "Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use." ''Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language.'' (2000) ed. Robert Stainton.</ref>
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| === Formal versus informal approaches ===
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| Another of the questions that has divided philosophers of language is the extent to which formal logic can be used as an effective tool in the analysis and understanding of natural languages. While most philosophers, including [[Gottlob Frege|Frege]], [[Alfred Tarski]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]], have been more or less skeptical about formalizing natural languages, many of them developed formal languages for use in the sciences or formalized ''parts'' of natural language for investigation. Some of the most prominent members of this tradition of formal semantics include Tarski, Carnap, [[Richard Montague]] and [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]].<ref>Partee, B. [http://people.umass.edu/partee/docs/Richard_Montague_by_%20Partee_05.pdf Richard Montague (1930–1971)]. In Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd Ed., ed. Keith Brown. Oxford: Elsevier. V. 8, pp. 255–57, 2006</ref>
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| On the other side of the divide, and especially prominent in the 1950s and 60s, were the so-called "Ordinary language philosophers". Philosophers such as [[P. F. Strawson]], [[John Langshaw Austin]] and [[Gilbert Ryle]] stressed the importance of studying natural language without regard to the truth-conditions of sentences and the references of terms. They did not believe that the social and practical dimensions of linguistic meaning could be captured by any attempts at formalization using the tools of logic. Logic is one thing and language is something entirely different. What is important is not expressions themselves but what people use them to do in communication.<ref>Lycan, W. G. (2000). ''Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction''. New York: Routledge.</ref>
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| Hence, Austin developed a theory of [[speech act]]s, which described the kinds of things which can be done with a sentence (assertion, command, inquiry, exclamation) in different contexts of use on different occasions.<ref>{{cite book |author=Austin, J.L.|year=1962 |title=[[How to Do Things With Words]]: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955|editor=ed. J.O. Urmson.|location=Oxford|publisher=Clarendon Press|isbn=0-674-41152-8}}</ref> Strawson argued that the truth-table semantics of the logical connectives (e.g., <math> \land </math>, <math> \lor </math> and <math> \rightarrow </math>) do not capture the meanings of their natural language counterparts ("and", "or" and "if-then").<ref>P. F. Strawson, "On Referring". ''Mind'', New Series, Vol. 59, No. 235 (Jul., 1950), pp. 320–344</ref> While the "ordinary language" movement basically died out in the 1970s, its influence was crucial to the development of the fields of speech-act theory and the study of [[pragmatics]]. Many of its ideas have been absorbed by theorists such as [[Kent Bach]], [[Robert Brandom]], [[Paul Horwich]] and [[Stephen Neale]].<ref name="Brand" />
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| While keeping these traditions in mind, the question of whether or not there is any grounds for conflict between the formal and informal approaches is far from being decided. Some theorists, like [[Paul Grice]], have been skeptical of any claims that there is a substantial conflict between logic and natural language.<ref>Grice, Paul. "Logic and Conversation". ''Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language.'' (2000) ed. Robert Stainton.</ref>
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| ===Translation and Interpretation===
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| Translation and interpretation are two other problems that philosophers of language have attempted to confront. In the 1950s, [[W.V. Quine]] argued for the indeterminacy of meaning and reference based on the principle of ''[[radical translation]]''. In ''[[Word and Object]]'', Quine asks the reader to imagine a situation in which he is confronted with a previously undocumented, primitive tribe and must attempt to make sense of the utterances and gestures that its members make. This is the situation of radical translation.<ref name="WVQ">Quine, W.V. (1960) ''Word and Object''. MIT Press; ISBN 0-262-67001-1.</ref>
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| He claimed that, in such a situation, it is impossible ''in principle'' to be absolutely certain of the meaning or reference that a speaker of the primitive tribe's language attaches to an utterance. For example, if a speaker sees a rabbit and says "gavagai", is she referring to the whole rabbit, to the rabbit's tail, or to a temporal part of the rabbit. All that can be done is to examine the utterance as a part of the overall linguistic behaviour of the individual, and then use these observations to interpret the meaning of all other utterances. From this basis, one can form a manual of translation. But, since reference is indeterminate, there will be many such manuals, no one of which is more correct than the others. For Quine, as for Wittgenstein and Austin, meaning is not something that is associated with a single word or sentence, but is rather something that, if it can be attributed at all, can only be attributed to a whole language.<ref name="WVQ" /> The resulting view is called ''[[semantic holism]]''.
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| Inspired by Quine's discussion, [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] extended the idea of radical translation to the interpretation of utterences and behavior within a single linguistic community. He dubbed this notion ''radical interpretation''. He suggested that the meaning that any individual ascribed to a sentence could only be determined by attributing meanings to many, perhaps all, of the individual's assertions as well as his mental states and attitudes.<ref name="TandI" />
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| == History ==
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| {{Further|History of linguistics}}
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| ===Antiquity===
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| Linguistic speculation in [[Indian subcontinent|India]] is attested since the [[Vedic period]] ([[Indian Iron Age|Iron Age]]), beginning with the deification of ''[[vāk]]'' "speech" and the role of language (utterance, [[shabda]]) in [[Kalpa (ritual)|ritual]]. [[Vyākaraṇa|Sanskrit grammatical tradition]] gives rise to linguistic philosophy beginning in the final centuries BC and early centuries AD, notably in the philosophical schools of [[Nyaya]] and [[Mimamsa]].
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| In the West, inquiry into language stretches back to the 5th century BC with [[Socrates]], [[Plato]], [[Aristotle]], and the [[Stoicism|Stoics]].<ref>Blackburn,S. "History of the Philosophy of Language". In ''Oxford Companion to Philosophy''. ed. Ted Honderich. Oxford:Oxford University Press. 1995. ISBN 0-19-866132-0</ref> Both in India and in Greece, linguistic speculation predates the emergence of [[grammar|grammatical traditions]] of systematic description of language, which emerged around the 5th century BC in India (see [[Yāska]]), and around the 3rd century BC in Greece (see [[Rhianus]]).
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| In the dialogue ''[[Cratylus (dialogue)|Cratylus]]'', Plato considered the question of whether the names of things were determined by convention or by nature. He criticized [[conventionalism]] because it led to the bizarre consequence that anything can be conventionally denominated by any name. Hence, it cannot account for the correct or incorrect application of a name. He claimed that there was a natural correctness to names. To do this, he pointed out that [[compound words]] and phrases have a range of correctness. He also argued that primitive names had a natural correctness, because each [[phoneme]] represented basic ideas or sentiments. For example, for Plato the letter ''l'' and its sound represented the idea of softness. However, by the end of the ''Cronic'', he had admitted that some social conventions were also involved, and that there were faults in the idea that phonemes had individual meanings.<ref>Plato, ''Cratylus''(c. 360 BCE) Series: Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato. Trans. David Sedley. Cambridge:University of Cambridge Press. 2003. ISBN 978-0-521-58492-0 also available from [http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/1616 Project Gutenberg]</ref>
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| Aristotle concerned himself with the issues of [[logic]], categories, and meaning creation. He separated all things into categories of [[species]] and [[genus]]. He thought that the meaning of a [[Predicate (grammar)|predicate]] was established through an abstraction of the similarities between various individual things. This theory later came to be called ''nominalism''.<ref>Steven K. Strange, (1992) ''Porphyry: On Aristotle, Categories''. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-2816-5.</ref> However, since Aristotle took these similarities to be constituted by a real commonality of form, he is more often considered a proponent of "moderate realism".
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| The [[Stoicism|Stoic]] philosophers made important contributions to the analysis of grammar, distinguishing five parts of speech: nouns, verbs, appellatives (names or [[epithet]]s), [[conjunctions]] and [[Article (grammar)|articles]]. They also developed a sophisticated doctrine of the ''lektón'' associated with each sign of a language, but distinct from both the sign itself and the thing to which it refers. This ''lektón'' was the meaning (or sense) of every term. The ''lektón'' of a sentence is what we would now call its [[proposition]]. Only propositions were considered "[[truth-bearer]]s" or "truth-vehicles" (i.e., they could be called true or false) while sentences were simply their vehicles of expression. Different ''lektá'' could also express things besides propositions, such as commands, questions and exclamations.<ref>Mates, B. (1953) ''Stoic Logic''. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-02368-4</ref>
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| ===Middle Ages===
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| Medieval philosophers were greatly interested in the subtleties of language and its usage. For many [[Scholasticism|scholastics]], this interest was provoked by the necessity of translating [[Greek language|Greek]] texts into [[Latin]]. There were several noteworthy philosophers of language in the medieval period. According to Peter J. King, (although this has been disputed), [[Peter Abelard]] anticipated the modern ideas of ''[[sense and reference]]''.<ref>King, Peter. ''Peter Abelard.'' Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abelard/#4</ref> Also, [[William of Ockham]]'s ''[[Sum of Logic|Summa Logicae]]'' brought forward one of the first serious proposals for codifying a mental language.<ref>Chalmers, D. (1999) "Is there Synonymy in Occam's Mental Language?". Published in ''The Cambridge Companion to Ockham'', edited by Paul Vincent Spade. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-58244-5</ref>
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| The scholastics of the high medieval period, such as Ockham and [[John Duns Scotus]], considered logic to be a ''scientia sermocinalis'' (science of language). The result of their studies was the elaboration of linguistic-philosophical notions whose complexity and subtlety has only recently come to be appreciated. Many of the most interesting problems of modern philosophy of language were anticipated by medieval thinkers. The phenomena of vagueness and ambiguity were analyzed intensely, and this led to an increasing interest in problems related to the use of ''syncategorematic'' words such as ''and'', ''or'', ''not'', ''if'', and ''every''. The study of ''categorematic'' words (or ''terms'') and their properties was also developed greatly.<ref name="MD">Marconi, D. "Storia della Filosofia del Linguaggio". In ''L'Enciclopedia Garzantina della Filosofia''. ed. Gianni Vattimo. Milan:Garzanti Editori. 1981. ISBN 88-11-50515-1</ref> One of the major developments of the scholastics in this area was the doctrine of the ''suppositio''.<ref name="KKP">[[Norman Kretzmann|Kretzmann, N.]], [[Anthony Kenny]] & [[Jan Pinborg]]. (1982) ''Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-22605-8</ref> The suppositio of a term is the interpretation that is given of it in a specific context. It can be ''proper'' or ''improper'' (as when it is used in [[metaphor]], [[metonym]]s and other figures of speech). A proper suppositio, in turn, can be either formal or material accordingly when it refers to its usual non-linguistic referent (as in "Charles is a man"), or to itself as a linguistic entity (as in "''Charles'' has seven letters"). Such a classification scheme is the precursor of modern distinctions between [[use–mention distinction|use and mention]], and between language and metalanguage.<ref name="KKP" />
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| There is a tradition called speculative grammar which existed from the 11th to the 13th century. Leading scholars included, among others, Martin of Dace and Thomas of Erfurth.
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| ===Early modern period===
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| Linguists of the [[Renaissance]] and [[Baroque]] periods such as [[Johannes Goropius Becanus]], [[Athanasius Kircher]] and [[John Wilkins]] were infatuated with the idea of a [[philosophical language]] reversing the [[confusion of tongues]], influenced by the gradual discovery of [[Chinese character]]s and [[Egyptian hieroglyphs]] (''[[Hieroglyphica]]''). This thought parallels the idea that there might be a universal language of music.
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| European scholarship began to absorb the [[Vyākaraṇa|Indian linguistic tradition]] only from the mid-18th century, pioneered by [[Jean François Pons]] and [[Henry Thomas Colebrooke]] (the ''editio princeps'' of [[Varadarāja]], a 17th-century [[Sanskrit]] grammarian, dating to 1849).
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| In the early 19th century, the Danish philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] insisted that language ought to play a larger role in Western philosophy. He argues that philosophy has not sufficiently focused on the role language plays in cognition and that future philosophy ought to proceed with a conscious focus on language:
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| {{quote|If the claim of philosophers to be unbiased were all it pretends to be, it would also have to take account of language and its whole significance in relation to speculative philosophy ... Language is partly something originally given, partly that which develops freely. And just as the individual can never reach the point at which he becomes absolutely independent ... so too with language.<ref>Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). In Cloeren, H. ''Language and Thought''. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.</ref>}}
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| Hence, language began to play a central role in Western philosophy in the late 19th century, especially with Port Royal in France, and in the English-speaking world and other parts of Europe. The foundational work was [[Ferdinand de Saussure]]'s ''[[Cours de linguistique générale]]'', published posthumously in 1916.
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| The philosophy of language then became so pervasive that for a time, in [[analytic philosophy]] circles, philosophy as a whole was understood to be a matter of philosophy of language. In the 20th century, "language" became an even more central theme within the most diverse traditions of philosophy. The phrase "the [[linguistic turn]]" was used to describe the noteworthy emphasis that modern-day philosophers put upon language.<ref name="MD">
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| Philosophy of Language in Africa. See John Aglo,"Norme et Symbole. Les Fondements philosophiques de l'obligation, L'Harmattan, Paris.
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| # Aglo, John (2001), 'Les Fondements philosophiques de la morale dans une société à tradition orale,# John Aglo, (2002) "La Vie et le Vivre ensemble", L'Harmattan, Paris.</ref>
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| ==Notes==
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| {{reflist|colwidth=30em}}
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| == References ==
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| # Aglo, John "Norme et Symbole. Les Fondement philosophiques de l'obligation, L'Harmattan, Paris.
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| # Aglo, John (2001), 'Les Fondements philosophiques de la morale dans une société à tradition orale, le système adanu, L'Harmattan, Paris.
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| # Aglo, John (2003), 'La Vie et le Vivre-ensemble. Le Principe organisateur de la vie dans le système adanu, L'Harmattan, Paris.
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| # Luca Corchia, [http://books.google.it/books?id=U56Sag72eSoC&pg=PP1&dq=habermas+corchia#v=onepage&q=&f=false ''La logica dei processi culturali. Jürgen Habermas tra filosofia e sociologia''], Genova, Edizioni ECIG, 2010, ISBN 978-88-7544-195-1.
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| ==External links==
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| *{{InPho|taxonomy|2231}}
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| *{{PhilPapers|category|philosophy-of-language}}
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| *{{IEP|lang-phi/|Philosophy of Language}}
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| *{{cite web |title=John Searle on the Philosophy of Language, Part 1 |publisher=flame0430's channel|url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOlJZabio3g|author=Bryan Magee interviews John Searle|date=March 14, 2008}} One of five parts, the others found [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FC3vosOlRZ4&hl=en&fs=1& here, 2] [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pMNMFaL-xrM here. 3] [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFX0wz86bMw here, 4] [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpyKwYNt9BM here, 5] There are also 16 lectures by Searle, beginning with {{cite web |title= Searle: Philosophy of Language, lecture 1 |url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uk5pIzCNOzU |date=October 25, 2011 |publisher=SocioPhilosophy's channel}}
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| *[http://sprachlogik.blogspot.com/ Sprachlogik] short articles in the philosophies of logic and language
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| *[http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/contents.htm Glossary of Linguistic terms]
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| * [http://linguistics.concordia.ca/i-language/ What is I-language?] - Chapter 1 of I-language: An Introduction to Linguistics as Cognitive Science.
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| * The [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/ London Philosophy Study Guide] offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/LPSG/Language.htm Philosophy of Language]
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| * Carnap, R., (1956). Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. University of Chicago Press.
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| * Collins, John. (2001). http://www.sorites.org/Issue_13/collins.htm
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| * Devitt, Michael and Hanley, Richard, eds. (2006) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell.
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| * Greenberg, Mark and Harman, Gilbert. (2005). Conceptual Role Semantics. http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/CRS.pdf
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| * Hale, B. and Crispin Wright, Ed. (1999). Blackwell Companions To Philosophy. Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers.
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| * Lepore, Ernest and Barry C. Smith (eds). (2006). [http://www.oup.co.uk/isbn/0-19-925941-0 The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language]. Oxford University Press.
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| * Lycan, W. G. (2000). Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction. New York, Routledge.
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| * Miller, James. (1999). http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pen-l/1999m12.1/msg00185.htm
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| * Searle, John (2007). [http://www.revel.inf.br/site2007/_pdf/8/entrevistas/revel_8_interview_john_searle.pdf Philosophy of Language]: an interview with John Searle.
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| * Stainton, Robert J. (1996). Philosophical perspectives on language. Peterborough, Ont., Broadview Press.
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| * Tarski, Alfred. (1944). ''[http://www.ditext.com/tarski/tarski.html The Semantical Conception of Truth]''.
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| *Umberto Eco. Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. 1986 Indiana University Press, ISBN 0253203988, 9780253203984
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| {{Philosophy topics}}
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| {{philosophy of language}}
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| {{analytic philosophy}}
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| {{DEFAULTSORT:Philosophy Of Language}}
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| [[Category:Philosophy of language| ]]
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